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NO. 21 MAY 2020 Introduction 
The Covid-19 Pandemic and 
Conflict Dynamics in Syria 
Neither a Turning Point Nor an Overall Determinant 
Muriel Asseburg, Hamidreza Azizi, Galip Dalay and Moritz Pieper 
Nine years into the (civil) war, Syria is in an extraordinarily poor position to confront 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead of the pandemic leading towards the uniting of local, 
regional, and international actors involved in Syria around a common purpose, con-
flict dynamics have hampered an effective response to Covid-19. Yet, the pandemic is 
unlikely to become a decisive turning point in conflict dynamics or an overall deter-
minant of its future trajectory. Rather, in the mid-term, the relevant actors are likely 
to continue to follow their strategic interests in Syria, while some will have to adjust 
their operational priorities, as well as the strategies to pursue them, against the back-
drop of the pandemic. Cooperation among external actors in solving the conflict is 
not set to get any easier. Trends of destabilisation and erosion of state capacity in the 
war-torn country are also likely to continue. Europeans should prioritise helping 
fight the pandemic in all areas of Syria and re-engage in diplomacy aimed at conflict 
settlement and the prevention of military escalation among involved actors. 
 
At first glance, it seems as if Syria has not 
been severely affected by the Covid-19 pan-
demic as of today. According to official 
figures of the Syrian Ministry of Health, by 
5 May 2020, there were 44 Syrians who had 
tested positive, 3 had died of the virus, and 
27 had recovered. On 30 April, the Kurdish-
dominated self-administration in the north-
east of the country announced two more 
cases; the oppositional Syrian Interim Gov-
ernment, nominally in control of the north-
west, reported no infections until 3 May. 
Yet, these numbers are unlikely to be reli-
able indicators of the pandemic’s spread in 
Syria. Rather, they reflect the low level of 
overall testing and the difficulties of con-
fronting the pandemic and its fallout in the 
war-torn and fragmented country. 
Pandemic Hits a Country in Crisis 
After nine years of (civil) war, Syria is in 
an extremely poor position to confront the 
pandemic, putting Syrians at very high risk. 
The country’s health system as well as the 
energy, water, and sanitation infrastructure 
have been largely destroyed in nine years 
of fighting, in particular in former and cur-
rent rebel-held areas. The Syrian Arab Army 
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and Russia’s air force have both deliberately 
targeted hospitals, clinics, and health work-
ers. According to the UN, at the outbreak of 
the pandemic, only 57 hospitals and clinics 
were fully operational in Syria. In early 
March 2020, there were an estimated 325 
ICUs with ventilators available throughout 
the country. These were distributed very 
unevenly, with some two-thirds in Damas-
cus and the provinces of Latakia and Tar-
tous, i.e. the regime heartlands, and none 
in Deir ez-Zor. Even those hospitals and 
clinics that are operational lack equipment, 
trained personnel, and medicine. 
Also, against the backdrop of a severe 
economic crisis in Syria – exacerbated 
by the financial crisis in Lebanon – state 
revenues have been severely reduced, leav-
ing few resources for Damascus to upscale 
health capacities and cushion the impact 
of preventive measures on the population, 
thus further increasing dependency on 
international humanitarian aid. With an 
expected drop in the remittances on which 
many Syrians depend and the impact of 
lockdown measures, living conditions are 
set to worsen. Already before the epidemic 
hit the country, according to the UN, more 
than 80 per cent of the population was liv-
ing below the poverty line, some 11 million 
Syrians were receiving humanitarian assis-
tance, and some 8 million of them were 
dependent on food aid. 
The risk of being affected by Covid-19 
is highest for some 6 million internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs), around 130,000 de-
tainees in regime prisons, and tens of thou-
sands of suspected Islamic State (IS) fighters 
and their families detained by the Kurdish-
dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
in camps and detention facilities. Most of 
these vulnerable groups live in cramped 
conditions that do not allow for social dis-
tancing, they lack access to health services, 
suffer from catastrophic hygienic condi-
tions, and often do not even have access to 
clean water. A spread of the virus among 
IDPs, prisoners, and detainees would be 
next to impossible to contain and lead to 
large numbers of fatalities. 
Conflict Dynamics Impede 
Confronting Covid-19 Challenges 
Rather than the pandemic uniting local, 
regional, and international actors around 
a common purpose, conflict dynamics have 
hampered an effective response to Covid-
19. The fragmentation of territorial control 
in Syria – between Damascus and its 
backers (Russia, Iran, Iran-backed militias); 
the Kurdish dominated self-administration 
and its supporters (mainly a reduced num-
ber of US troops); Turkey and allied militias; 
as well as the Syrian Salvation Government 
linked to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an 
al-Qaida offshoot of Salafist jihadis – and 
continued conflict between the players 
have rendered a joint or coordinated ap-
proach to Covid-19 impossible. Also, none 
of the crucial external actors has changed 
course so as to allow for an effective tack-
ling of the humanitarian needs resulting 
from the pandemic. 
In addition, interventions by international 
humanitarian actors have been severely 
hampered by the lack of access to territories 
outside the control of Damascus. This prob-
lem has been compounded by restrictions 
on mobility imposed by Damascus and de 
facto authorities to contain the pandemic 
as well as by the closure of two border cross-
ings (al-Ya’rubiya on the border with Iraq, 
al-Ramtha on the border with Jordan, both 
formerly used for international cross-border 
aid to circumvent Damascus) based on Secu-
rity Council Resolution 2504 of January 
2020. It has also been magnified by inter-
national actors such as the WHO relying 
on Damascus as their main counterpart 
in addressing the Covid-19 challenge while 
avoiding to deal with de facto authorities 
in the north-west and north-east of the 
country. The problem has been especially 
stark east of the Euphrates, where the WHO 
shunned contacts and refrained from aid 
deliveries until mid-April 2020. What is 
more, Damascus and Ankara have both 
used the denial of access to north-east Syria 
for humanitarian actors and aid deliveries 
as a means of putting pressure on the Kurd-
ish-dominated self-administration to, re-
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spectively, agree to a deal on terms set by 
Damascus or respect Turkey’s red lines. 
Turkey has also repeatedly withheld drink-
ing water to areas in the north-east. In 
the same vein, humanitarian access to the 
Rukban Camp on the Jordanian border has 
been denied by Damascus (and by Russian 
troops stationed in the area) to increase the 
pressure on US-backed rebels in the enclave 
to surrender. In the wake of the pandemic, 
Jordan also no longer allows direct cross-
border aid deliveries to the camp. 
Measures adopted by local actors to con-
tain the spread of the virus and prepare 
for dealing with infections have also been 
undermined by conflict dynamics. The 
government of Syria and de facto authori-
ties in other parts of the country have each 
adopted similar, yet uncoordinated meas-
ures to prevent the spread of the pandemic, 
such as: a partial closure of borders, mob-
ility restrictions, curfews, the suspension of 
non-essential economic activities, the intro-
duction of part-time hours for the public 
sector, and the closure of schools and uni-
versities. Two communities that turned out 
to be hotspots of infections (Manin and al-
Sayyada Zainab) have been quarantined to 
prevent the spread of the virus. Damascus 
has also granted amnesty to criminals and 
defectors (although to date no meaningful 
release of prisoners has been registered) and 
postponed parliamentary elections that had 
been scheduled for mid-April. Damascus 
and the SDF apparently have suspended 
military recruitment, and the SDF declared 
a unilateral cease-fire. Yet, border closures 
and travel restrictions have been under-
mined by the continued movement of fight-
ers, in particular between Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Syria. Also, incentives to engage in 
smuggling activities have increased further 
against the backdrop of scarcity and enor-
mous price hikes, in particular for medicine 
and food. Last but not least, the so-called IS 
has tried to exploit a situation – in which 
it sees its local, regional, and international 
enemies focused on fighting the pandemic 
– to raise its profile and reinvigorate its 
networks, leading to an upsurge in attacks 
across the country as well as mutinies and 
(attempted) prison outbreaks, in particular 
from the SDF’s detention facilities. 
Covid-19 Impacts the 
Military Balance of Power 
Actors involved in the Syrian conflict have 
been impacted differently by the pandemic, 
depending on how much they have been 
afflicted by Covid-19, the repercussions on 
available resources (e.g. state revenues), and 
the manner of involvement in the conflict 
(e.g. reliance on ground troops vs. air force). 
The respective impacts have reflected on 
actors’ military capabilities, and thus on the 
overall military power balance. In contrast, 
the pandemic has not had a pacifying effect. 
As a case in point, some observers have 
held that one effect of the pandemic is 
that a cease-fire in Idlib province has lasted 
longer than originally expected. Yet, it seems 
that the relative calm in the area agreed 
upon is less a direct effect of involved actors 
adjusting to Covid-19 than an expression of 
the main parties – in particular, Turkey, 
HTS, and Damascus and its backers – pre-
paring for the next round of fighting so as 
to defend what each sees as vital interests. 
The limited ceasefire arrangement agreed 
upon by Russia and Turkey on 5 March 
2020 was to establish a secure corridor 
along the M4 motorway connecting Latakia 
on the coast and Aleppo, Syria’s commer-
cial centre. Although it stopped the regime’s 
offensive aimed at re-conquering the whole 
of the former de-escalation zone, it did not 
provide lasting arrangements for any of the 
points of contention. As was the case with 
previous Turkish-Russian agreements, this 
one also put the responsibility of separating 
HTS from moderate Syrian rebels on Tur-
key’s shoulders – an impossible task given 
the grip of HTS over the area and its rejec-
tion of the deal. Accordingly, joint Turkish-
Russian patrols along the M4 motorway, a 
central provision of the agreement, have 
faced local protests and attacks instigated 
by HTS. At the same time, Turkey has used 
the lull in fighting to forestall Damascus 
from re-conquering further territory north 
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of the M4 by increasing the number of its 
troops there to some 20,000. In the same 
vein, Turkey has also been trying to con-
solidate Syrian rebels under one umbrella 
– the Syrian National Army – and beef up 
their ranks. Yet, given the fact that Russia 
controls the airspace in north-west Syria, 
Turkey’s military build-up there will re-
main vulnerable. Finally, yet importantly, 
the pandemic has prompted Ankara to 
further tighten its control over the Syrian-
Turkish border and to toughen up its meas-
ures against refugee inflows. 
What is more, the pandemic has had 
an effect on the military power balance in 
the country, to the benefit of those (mainly) 
engaged with air power and to the detri-
ment of those engaged with ground forces. 
In this vein, Covid-19 has led to a redeploy-
ment of Russian troops in north-west Syria, 
reducing their presence among local allies. 
Yet, Moscow’s primary engagement, i.e. 
the Russian air force’s sorties in support of 
Syrian ground troops and allied militias, is 
hardly being affected by the pandemic. In 
the same vein, Israel’s military engagement 
in Syria has not only continued unimpeded 
by Covid-19, with the Israeli air force con-
tinuing to carry out airstrikes against Ira-
nian and Iran-backed militia targets in Syria. 
Israel has even stepped up these attacks this 
spring, seizing the opportunity to increase 
the pressure on Iran and its non-state allies 
in Syria during a difficult time for the 
Islamic Republic. 
In contrast, Iran – the country hit the 
hardest by the pandemic in the Middle 
East – has had to adjust its presence and 
activities. The pandemic has forced almost 
all parts of the Iranian government, includ-
ing the Army and the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC), to focus on curbing the 
crisis inside the country. It has also worsened 
Iran’s economic difficulties due to lockdown 
measures and a significant drop in global 
oil prices, thus compounding the impact 
of US sanctions. As a result, Iran’s financial 
resources to support its allies and proxy 
groups in Syria have been considerably re-
stricted. In the Idlib theatre, this has mainly 
affected the mercenary Afghan and Paki-
stani fighters of the Fatemiyoun and Zaine-
biyoun brigades, which have seen reduced 
levels of funding. In addition, the Corona 
crisis has prompted a significant number 
of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Popular 
Mobilization Units forces operating in Syria 
to return home to help fight the virus out-
break, thus affecting Iran’s overall posture 
in the country. 
Crucial Actors Likely to Adapt 
Priorities and Approaches 
In the mid-term (i.e. for the next 2–3 
years), the relevant local, regional, and 
global actors are unlikely to alter their pur-
suit of strategic interests in Syria due to 
Covid-19, as they overwhelmingly perceive 
them to be vital. Yet, actors might adapt 
their operational priorities, as well as the 
strategies to pursue them, due to the effects 
that the pandemic is having on available 
resources. 
Russia 
Although the impacts of the pandemic, in 
particular the drop in global oil prices and 
demand, have increased the pressure on an 
already strained Russian budget, Moscow’s 
aims in Syria – preventing Western-led 
regime change and reintroducing itself as 
a central player that cannot be ignored in 
conflict settlement – are unlikely to change 
due to Covid-19. Yet, seeking material 
compensation for its war effort through 
resource extraction in Syria might become 
more of an operational priority. Russia is 
therefore likely to continue to support 
Damascus in re-asserting territorial control 
over the whole of Syria. This includes not 
only Idlib province and adjacent areas, but 
also oil-rich areas east of the Euphrates, the 
control of which would increase revenues 
also for Russia, as Moscow has obtained 
long-term agreements securing a significant 
share in Syria’s energy sector. Russia is also 
likely to remain engaged with regard to 
political and military reform in Syria, in-
creasing the pressure on the heads of the 
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regime to take steps that would ensure 
long-term stability and decrease the num-
ber of obstacles to reconstruction, such as 
pervasive corruption. 
Iran and Israel 
Iran is another case in point. Against the 
backdrop of the economic impact and the 
domestic needs resulting from the Corona 
crisis in the Islamic Republic, a considera-
ble reduction of Iran’s military activities in 
Syria is to be expected, at least until the end 
of the pandemic at home. In addition, in 
the wake of the January 2020 assassination 
of General Qasem Soleimani, commander 
of the IRGC’s Quds Force, by the US, Iran’s 
primary regional focus had shifted from 
Syria to Iraq with the aim of securing its 
influence there. Yet, these adaptations do 
not imply that Iran’s main interests in Syria 
will change. Rather, Iran’s top priorities 
are likely to continue to be the return of all 
Syrian territory to the control of the central 
government as well as keeping Bashar 
al-Assad in power. In addition, the goal of 
ending the US military presence in Syria 
(and the region), which was added to Iran’s 
list of objectives after the assassination of 
Soleimani, is also likely to remain a top 
priority. 
Tehran will also probably seek to main-
tain its hold on strategically important 
parts of Syria. This is especially the case 
with regard to the Syrian-Iraqi border areas 
in Deir ez-Zor province, as control over 
these areas is crucial for Iran’s long-term 
plans to secure a land bridge to the Medi-
terranean. Yet, against the backdrop of 
dwindling revenues in Iran, this endeavour 
is likely to become more challenging. In 
this vein, a reduction of financial incentives 
for local tribes in Deir ez-Zor is likely to 
weaken the loyalty of those tribes. Also, 
difficulties in paying salaries to mercenar-
ies, such as the Fatemiyoun brigade, will 
weaken Iran’s network of allied militias. 
Declining economic resources also over-
shadow Iran’s plans to play a role in Syria’s 
economic reconstruction and thus gain a 
long-term foothold through investments. 
Israel, by contrast, is neither likely to 
pursue different interests in Syria than it 
has to date, nor dramatically change its 
modus operandi. The Israeli government 
has largely refrained from taking a position 
in the civil war, but it has increasingly 
been concerned about the growing Iranian 
presence in its immediate neighbourhood. 
Signs that Iran and its ally, the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, were about to establish a perma-
nent presence near the border – and from 
there open another front against Israel – 
prompted the Israeli government to step up 
its diplomatic activities in 2017. As that did 
not yield the intended results, Israel switched 
to an approach of active military contain-
ment of Iran and its allies in Syria and, 
increasingly, in Iraq. Ever since, Israeli air 
strikes have aimed at preventing the estab-
lishment of Iranian and Iranian proxies’ 
military bases and arms factories as well as 
the transfer of strategic weapons to Hez-
bollah. 
Turkey 
Although it will have to partially adapt its 
approach in Syria to its own economic and 
financing needs, Turkey is also likely to 
maintain its strategic interests in Syria. In 
this context, even though the March 2020 
Idlib ceasefire agreement has temporarily 
lessened the immediate pressure posed by 
IDPs on Turkey’s border, Ankara remains 
first and foremost concerned about the close 
to one million IDPs in north-west Syria’s 
border region – their future remains un-
certain, in particular in view of another 
potential regime offensive backed by Rus-
sia. Turkey will therefore continue to pur-
sue the objective of creating some form of 
safe or buffer zone in Idlib – in which 
IDPs would remain on the Syrian side of 
the border – and try to enlist European 
and US support for that effort. 
Second, Ankara will continue to try 
leveraging its military presence in the 
political process in order to safeguard its 
interests in the future order of Syria. It is 
therefore safe to assume that Turkey will 
not downsize its military engagement 
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before a political process is underway that 
would protect Ankara’s interest. In the 
same vein, it will continue trying to shape 
and empower its local Syrian allies. 
Third, Ankara will continue to seek capi-
talising on its military might in Syria in 
order to minimise the Syrian Kurdish posi-
tion. Its main interests are to prevent a 
territory along its border that is controlled 
by authorities which Ankara deems hostile, 
in particular the SDF – which is dominated 
by the Democratic Union Party, which is 
seen by Ankara as the Syrian branch of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – as well as 
keeping the SDF from attaining any politi-
cal status or constitutional recognition. 
At the same time, the Covid-19 pandemic 
will force adjustments in Turkey’s approach 
to global actors in Syria, prompting it to 
pay more attention to US concerns than it 
had prior to the pandemic. Covid-19 hit 
Turkey at a moment when it was already 
suffering from economic difficulties, a high 
budget deficit, a rapidly weakening cur-
rency, and a low level of foreign exchange 
reserves. It has increased Ankara’s need to 
gain access to international finances, which 
in turn requires it to improve its relations 
with the US. In line with this interest, 
Ankara announced in April 2020 that it 
would delay the activation of the S-400 mis-
sile systems it had purchased from Russia, 
thus removing a major irritant in bilateral 
relations with Washington, at least for the 
time being. Turkey will also have to adapt 
its approach in Syria to make it less con-
frontational for the US. In practical terms, 
this makes it rather implausible that 
Turkey will undertake further military 
advances vis-à-vis the US-backed SDF east 
of the Euphrates any time soon. Rather, 
Turkey is likely to pursue an indirect 
approach to weakening and destabilising 
the administrative and security structures 
there by encouraging local resistance. 
US 
As Washington has sent contradictory 
signals regarding its interests, allies (first 
the rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), 
then the SDF), and level of military and 
political engagement during both the 
Obama and Trump presidencies, the US 
is the actor whose priorities and concrete 
involvement are the most difficult to pre-
dict in the mid-term. As with other relevant 
actors, the strategic interests of the US are 
also likely to remain stable in the wake 
of the pandemic. They concern, primarily, 
preventing a resurgence of the IS – for 
which the pandemic provides an auspicious 
opportunity – and countering Iranian 
influence. The US is also likely to remain 
involved in Syria against the backdrop of 
the great power competition there and to 
protect its allies in the Middle East – Israel, 
above all. Yet, it is unclear how much these 
interests will be undermined by the prom-
ise of withdrawing troops from the region 
and by having to adapt the US posture (and 
fight against the IS) in neighbouring Iraq 
following the Soleimani assassination. 
Therefore, the (already reduced) US military 
presence should not be taken for granted, 
neither in the north-east in support of the 
SDF, nor in the al-Tanf enclave on the 
motorway linking Baghdad to Damascus. 
Although it is safe to assume that, in the 
case of a Democratic Party election victory 
in late 2020, US strategic interests would 
remain the same, it is unclear how a future 
President Joe Biden would adjust the level 
of ambition and the US military presence 
in Syria. Still, some policy elements are 
already set, as the Trump Administration’s 
approach in Syria has been backed up by a 
comprehensive set of sanctions (so-called 
Caesar sanctions), adopted with bipartisan 
consensus in the US Congress in December 
2019. This sanctions package is unlikely to 
be revoked or significantly softened any 
time soon. 
Covid-19: Another Intervening 
Factor in the Syrian Theatre 
Concerning mid-term conflict dynamics in 
Syria, the Corona pandemic is unlikely to 
become either a turning point, a catalyst 
propelling the conflict in a clear direction, 
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or an overall determinant. Rather, it will 
most likely turn out to be one intervening 
factor among a variety of factors affecting 
cooperation formats, military strength, 
power balance, and prospects for stabili-
sation. 
Cooperation between the guarantors of 
the Astana process (Russia, Turkey, and 
Iran), which was launched in January 2017 
to jointly resolve the conflict in Syria, is 
not set to get any easier. In the beginning, 
the Astana approach of de-escalation zones 
and reconciliation agreements had proved 
highly effective in restructuring Syria’s 
conflict dynamics in a way that benefitted 
the regime and diminished the opposition, 
while safeguarding the interests of the 
Astana-3. However, an agreement on the 
endgame along the Turkish-Syrian border 
will be difficult to achieve, and renewed 
fighting in the province of Idlib will once 
more increase the risk of direct confron-
tations between them. 
Although the conflict over Idlib has at 
times been a hard test for Turkish-Russian 
relations, mutual accommodation has so 
far prevailed. Yet, an ever greater level of 
involvement by Russia and Turkey on op-
posing sides of the civil war in Libya, which 
started well before the pandemic and has 
turned Syria into a theatre for the recruit-
ment of mercenaries for the war effort in 
Libya, is likely to increase the intensity of 
the confrontation between the two – and 
reflect negatively on cooperation in the 
Astana format. 
In addition, with regard to the conflict in 
Idlib, Turkey and Russia have preferred to 
cut deals bilaterally, without involving Iran. 
That has raised concerns in Tehran about 
being sidelined when it comes to decisions 
on Syria’s future order. Should Tehran fail 
to keep the Astana framework alive, it 
might turn to undermining Russian-Turkish 
agreements on the ground. What is more, 
unlike in the 2016 battle of Aleppo, in which 
Russia and Iran fought in unison, the con-
flict over Idlib is likely to continue to drive 
the wedge between Iran and Russia. Despite 
a likely decrease in Iran’s direct military 
involvement in Syria in the years to come, 
Iran’s political rivalry with Turkey will 
continue, and its relations with Russia 
will become more strained. 
There are at least three more arenas that 
will continue to bear (or increasingly bear) a 
high risk of military escalation. This is, first, 
the north-east, with its high concentration 
of local, regional, and international troops 
and militias – an area where, similar to 
Idlib, interim agreements have frozen the 
lines of conflict rather than resolved any 
points of contention. Second, it concerns 
the antagonism between Israel and the US, 
on the one hand, and Iran and its allies on 
the other. An increasingly assertive Israeli 
posture had already brought the antago-
nists to the brink of direct military confron-
tation in February 2018, and the US and 
Iran have clashed repeatedly in the Persian 
Gulf. Third, it applies to endeavours by the 
IS to profit from the chaos and contested 
control in many parts of Syria, allowing it 
to conduct operations as well as regroup 
and recruit. 
Although the Syrian regime will remain 
set on re-conquering the remaining terri-
tory, that process might take longer than 
envisioned due to increasingly strained 
resources in Damascus and Tehran. At the 
same time, a trend of destabilisation in 
territories nominally under the control of 
Damascus is likely to continue. Even before 
the pandemic, protests against bad govern-
ance and the lack of services had been 
on the rise in several parts of the country, 
including traditional strongholds of the 
regime. Armed confrontations between 
remnants of rebel formations and regime 
forces had escalated in so-called reconciled 
areas, especially in the southern Deraa 
province. It is safe to assume that the level 
of popular unrest will rise in the case of 
continued lockdown measures that prevent 
income-generating activities, against the 
background of a continued decline in remit-
tances, and a trend of erosion of state func-
tions due to the precarious fiscal situation 
of Damascus. 
A reversal of the destabilisation trend is 
unlikely to come through agreement in the 
UN-facilitated constitutional committee or a 
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strong reconstruction drive. Damascus has 
not shown any interest in political com-
promise, and it has neither funds to invest 
nor has it been successful in repatriating 
diaspora capital. In addition, already before 
the economic effects of the Corona pan-
demic became a factor, Russia and Iran 
were not in a position to provide money for 
a comprehensive, countrywide reconstruc-
tion. Other potential supporters have either 
categorically rejected involvement without 
seeing progress in conflict resolution or 
political openings (US), or they have been 
hesitant to engage (the Arab States of the 
Persian Gulf), positioned themselves for 
involvement at a later stage (China), or 
focussed on areas controlled by them and 
their local proxies (Turkey). The economic 
effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, especially 
the sharp fall in the price of oil, are further 
reducing the availability of resources, in 
particular those of the Arab Gulf States. The 
pending enactment of comprehensive sec-
ondary sanctions on Syria by the US (so-called 
Caesar sanctions) will further deter inter-
national engagement in Syria’s reconstruc-
tion. 
In this vein, even though the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) has stepped up its 
normalisation with Damascus in the wake 
of the Corona crisis and pledged support for 
fighting the virus, it seems that the move 
was motivated more by an interest to have 
the regime increase military pressure on 
the Emirates’ regional rival Turkey through 
a renewal of military operations in Idlib 
than an interest to assist in the long-term 
stabilisation and reconstruction of Syria. 
The UAE’s main aim seems to be to get 
Turkey bogged down in the Levant so that 
Ankara can devote less attention and fewer 
resources to Libya. 
Policy Recommendations 
The EU and its member states have little 
influence on the conflict dynamics in Syria. 
In the short term, they should prioritise 
helping fight the pandemic there, rather 
than treating it through the prism of con-
flict dynamics, as other actors do. This im-
plies at least two core elements: first, 
insisting on maintaining – or rather ex-
panding – access to humanitarian aid and 
health support in all areas of Syria, and in 
this vein preparing a follow-up to Security 
Council Resolution 2504, which will expire 
in July 2020, so as to allow for cross-border 
aid operations. Second, Europe should 
encourage the cooperation of the WHO and 
other international bodies with the de facto 
authorities in the north-east and north-west 
of the country to fight the pandemic, and, 
in particular, to address the challenges in 
detention centres and IDP camps. 
Europeans should then focus on diplo-
macy and work towards arrangements that 
make the protection of the civilian popu-
lation a priority, as well as promote a nego-
tiated conflict settlement that achieves a 
balance between local, regional, and inter-
national interests based on international 
law. In this context, it would also make 
sense to interlink the various multilateral 
processes – the Astana process, the so-
called Small Group, and the Geneva pro-
cess – more closely. A first meeting be-
tween the heads of state and government 
of Germany, France, Russia, and Turkey 
in October 2018 marked the start of such 
an endeavour, but it has lacked follow-up. 
Europeans should also facilitate talks 
that would contribute to a modus vivendi 
between Turkey and the SDF as well as Iran 
and the US/Israel. 
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